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PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO IMPLEMENT THE
CONVENTION METHOD OF AMENDING
THE CONSTITUTION
Sam ]. Ervin, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

V 0£ the Constitution of the United States1 provides that
constitutional amendments may be proposed in either 0£ two
ways-by nvo-thirds of both houses of the Congress or by a convention called by the Congress in response to the applications of nvothirds of the state legislatures. Although the framers of the Constitution evidently contemplated that the nvo methods of initiating
amendments would operate as parallel procedures, neither superior
to the other, this has not been the case historically. Each 0£ the
twenty-five constitutional amendments ratified to date was proposed
by the Congress under the first alternative. As a result, although the
mechanics and limitations of congressional power under the first
alternative are generally understood, very little exists in the way of
precedent or learning relating to the unused alternative method in
article V. This became distressingly clear recently, following the disclosure that thirty-two state legislatures had, in one form or another,
petitioned the Congress to call a convention to propose a constitutional amendment permitting states to apportion their legislatures
on the basis of some standard other than the Supreme Court's "one
man-one vote" requirement. The scant information and considerable misinformation and even outright ignorance displayed on the
subject of constitutional amendment, both within the Congress and
outside of it-and particularly the dangerous precedents threatened
by acceptance of some of the constitutional misconceptions put forth
-prompted me to introduce in the Senate a legislative proposal designed to implement the convention amendment provision in article V. This article will discuss that provision of the Constitution,

A

RTICLE

• United States Senator from North Carolina.-Ed.
1. The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight
shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the
first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CoNST. art. V.
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the major questions involved in its implementation, and the answers to those questions supplied by the provisions of the bill, Senate
Bill No. 2307.2
,
II. BACKGROUND
On March 26, 1962, the United States Supreme Court, in the
landmark case of Baker v. Carr,8 held that state legislative apportionment is subject to judicial review in federal courts, thus overruling a long line of earlier decisions to the contrary. Two years
later, on June 15, 1964, in Reynolds v. Sims,4 the controversial "one
man-one vote" decision, the Court held that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that both houses of
bicameral state legislatures be apportioned on a population basis.
The two decisions evoked a storm of controversy. In the Congress, dissatisfaction with the Court's intrusion into the hitherto
nonjusticiable political thicket resulted in attempts in both houses
to reverse the rulings by legislation or constitutional amendment.
On August 19, 1964, the House of Representatives passed a bill introduced by Representative Tuck of Virginia which would have
stripped federal district courts of jurisdiction over state apportionment cases and denied the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
over such cases. The Senate declined to invoke that extreme remedy,
passing instead a "sense of Congress" resolution that the state legislatures should be given time to reapportion before the federal judiciary intervened further. In both 1965 and 1966, however, a majority
of the Senate voted to propose the so-called "Dirksen amendment"
to the Constitution, which would permit a state to apportion one
house of its bicameral legislature on some standard other than population. But the amendment failed both times to get the required
two-thirds vote, failing fifty-seven to thirty-nine in 1965 and fiftyfive to thirty-eight in 1966.
A more extraordinary effect of the rulings in Baker v. Carr and
Reynolds v. Sims was the activity generated in the state legislatures
designed to reverse the Court's rulings by means of a constitutional
amendment proposed by a convention convened under the second
clause of article V. In December 1962, following Baker v. Carr, the
Council of State Governments, at its Sixteenth Biennial General
Assembly of the States, recommended that the state legislatures peti2. The text of the bill, as amended, is set forth as an appendix to this Article. As of
this writing, the amended bill has not been approved by the Committee on the
Judiciary. The reported bill may include additional amendments.
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
4. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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tion the Congress for a constitutional convention to propose three
amendments, including an amendment to accomplish essentially the
same purpose as the Tuck bill, that is, the denial to federal courts
of original and appellate jurisdiction over state legislative apportionment cases. In response to this call, twelve state petitions were sent
to the Congress during 1963 requesting a constitutional convention
to propose such an amendment.5 Although this was the largest number of petitions on the same subject ever received by the Congress
in any one year, the total was far below the required thirty-four, and
their receipt caused no excitement in the Congress and attracted
no public attention.
In December 1964, following the decision in Reynolds v. Sims,
the Seventeenth Biennial General Assembly of the States recommended that the state legislatures petition the Congress to convene
a constitutional convention to propose an amendment along the
lines of the Dirksen amendment, permitting the states to apportion
one house of a bicameral legislature on some standard other than
population. The response to this call was even greater than in 1963.
Twenty-two states submitted constitutional convention petitions to
Congress during the Eighty-ninth Congress (1965 and 1966) and
four more during the first session of the Ninetieth Congress (1967).
If one counted the petitions adopted by four other states, questionable in regard to their proper receipt by Congress,6 this brought
the total number of state petitions on the subject of state legislative
apportionment to thirty-two.
At this point, March 1967, the situation attracted the first attention in the press. A New York Times story on March 18, 1967,7
reported that only two more petitions were necessary to invoke the
convention amendment procedure. The immediate reaction was a
rash of newspaper editorials and articles, almost uniformly critical
of the effort to obtain a convention, and a flurry of speeches on the
subject in the Congress. Whether favorable or unfavorable to the
efforts by the states, all of these press items and all of the congressional speeches had one common denominator. They all bore the
obvious imprint of the authors' feelings about the merits of state
legislative apportionment. Those newspapers that had editorially
supported the Supreme Court's decisions now decried the states'
5. Copies of the applications referred to herein are on file in the offices of the Committees on the Judiciary of the United States Senate and House of Representatives.
6. New Hampshire, Colorado, Utah, and Georgia have adopted applications, but
copies are not on file with the Senate and House Judiciary Committees.
7. The New York Times, March 18, 1967 (city ed.), at 1, col. 6.
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"back-door assault on the Constitution." 8 Those newspapers that
had criticized one man-one vote now applauded the effort by the
state legislatures to overrule the new principle by constitutional
amendment. Much more disturbing to me was the fact that many
of my colleagues in the Senate seemed to be influenced more by
their views on the reapportionment issue than by concern for the
need to answer objectively some of the perplexing constitutional
questions raised by the states' action. Those Senators who had been
critical of the "one man-one vote" decision and were eager to undo
it now expressed the conviction that the Congress was obligated to
call a convention when thirty-four petitions were on hand and that
it had little power to judge the validity of state petitions. Those
senators who agreed with the Supreme Court's ruling were now contending that some or all of the petitions were invalid for a variety
of reasons and should be discounted, and that, in any case, Congress
did not have to call a convention if it did not wish to. Most distressing of all was the apparent readiness of everyone to concede
that any convention, once convened, would be unlimited in the
scope of its authority and empowered to run rampant over the Constitution, proposing any amendment or amendments that happened
to strike its fancy. That interpretation, supported neither by logic
nor constitutional history, served the convenience of both sides in
the apportionment controversy. Those who did not want to call
a convention that might propose a reapportionment amendment
pointed out that an open convention would surely be a constitutional nightmare. Opponents of one man-one vote cited the horrors
of an open convention as an additional reason for proposal of a
reapportionment amendment by the Congress.
My conviction was that the constitutional questions involved
were far more important than the reapportionment issue that had
brought them to light, and that they should receive more orderly
and objective consideration than they had so far been accorded.
Certainly it would be grossly unfortunate if the partisanship over
state legislative apportionment-and I am admittedly a partisan on
that issue-should be allowed to distort an attempt at clarification
of the amendment process, which in the long run must command
a higher obligation and duty than any single issue that might be
the subject of that process. Any congressional action on this subject
would be a precedent for the future, and the unseemly squabble
that had already erupted was to me a certain indication that only
8. Editorial, The Washington Post, March 21, 1967, at A·IO, col. 1.
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bad precedents could result from an effort to settle questions of
procedure under article V simultaneously with the presentation of
a substantive issue by two-thirds of the states. Although it is not
easy to anticipate all of the problems that may develop in the convention amendment process, nor to deal with those problems wisely
in the abstract, I nevertheless felt that the wisest course would be
to consider and enact permanent legislation to implement the convention amendment provision in article V.
I introduced S. 2307 on August 17, 1967. In my statement accompanying introduction, I stressed that I was not committed to the
provisions of the bill as then drafted. I was convinced only of the
necessity for action on the subject, action that might forestall a congressional choice between chaos on the one hand and refusal to
abide the commands of article V on the other. Open hearings on
the bill were held on October 30 and 31, 1967, before the Senate
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. The testimony revealed deficiencies in the bill and suggested modifications and additions. As
a result, I have subsequently amended the bill in several respects.
In discussing specific questions raised by the bill, I shall describe
the relevant provision of the original draft and note the amendments made since the hearings.
Ill.

QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE BILL

Before going to specific issues and matters of detail, it seems
appropriate to discuss briefly two threshold problems posed by
the bill: whether the Congress has the power to enact such legislation, and, if it does, what policy considerations should guide it
in exercising such power.
I have no doubt that the Congress has the power to legislate
about the process of amendment by convention. The Congress is
made the agency for calling the convention, and it is hard to see
why the Congress should have been involved in this alternative
method of proposal at all unless it was expected to determine such
questions as when sufficient appropriate applications had been received and to provide for the membership and procedures of the
convention and for review and ratification of its proposals. Obviously the fifty state legislatures cannot themselves legislate on this
subject. The constitutional convention cannot do so for it must
first be brought into being. All that is left, therefore, is the Congress, which, in respect to this and other issues not specifically settled by the Constitution, has the residual power to legislate on
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matters that require uniform settlement. Add to this the weight of
such decisions as Coleman v. lviiller, 9 to the effect that questions
arising in the amending process are nonjusticiable political questions exclusively in the congressional domain, and the conclusion
seems inescapable that the Congress has plenary power to legislate
on the subject of amendment by convention and to settle every
point not actually settled by article V of the Constitution itself.
With respect to the second problem, within what general policy
limitations that power should be exercised, I think the Congress
should be extremely careful to close as few doors as possible. Any
legislation on this subject will be what might be called "quasi-organic" legislation; in England it would be recognized as a constitutional statute. When dealing with such a measure, it is wise to
bear in mind Marshall's well-worn aphorism that it is a Constitution we are expounding and not get involved in "an unwise attempt
to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen
at all, must [be] seen dimly, and which can best be provided for as
they occur." 10 This approach is reflected at several points in the bill,
notably in its failure to try to anticipate and enumerate the various
grounds on which Congress might justifiably rule a state petition
invalid, and its failure to prescribe rigid rules of procedure for
the convention. In addition, I think the Congress, in exercising its
power under article V, should bear in mind that the Framers meant
the convention method of amendment to be an attainable means
of constitutional change. This legislation can be drawn so as to
place as many hurdles as possible in the way of effective use of the
process; or it can be drawn in a manner that will make such a process
a possible, however improbable, method of amendment. The first
alternative would be a flagrant disavowal of the clear language and
intended function of article V. I have assumed that the Congress
will wish to take the second road, and the bill is drawn with that
principle in mind.

A. Open or Limited Convention?
Perhaps the most important issue raised by the bill is the question of the power of the Congress to limit the scope and authority
of a convention convened under article V in accordance with the
desires of the states as set forth in their applications. This was, as
I have noted, one of the issues that most troubled me when I first
heard of the efforts by the states to call a convention.
9. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
10. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819).
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It has been argued that the subject matter of a convention convened under article V cannot be limited, since a constitutional convention is a premier assembly of the people, exercising all the power
that the people themselves possess, and therefore supreme to all
other governmental branches or agencies. Certainly, according to
this argument, the states may not themselves, in their applications,
dictate limitations on the convention's deliberations. They may not
require the Congress to submit to the convention a given text of
an amendment, nor even a single subject or idea. For the convention must be free to "propose" amendments, which suggests the
freedom to canvass matters afresh and to weigh all possibilities and
alternatives rather than ratify a single text or idea. The states may
in their applications specify the amendment or amendments they
would hope the convention would propose. But once the Congress
calls the convention, those specifications would not control its deliberations. The convention could not be restricted to the consideration of certain topics and forbidden to consider certain other
topics, nor could it be forbidden to write a new constitution if it
should choose to do so.
I will concede that such an interpretation can be wrenched from
article V-but only through a mechanical and literal reading of
the words of the article, totally removed from the context of their
promulgation and history. My reading of the debates on article V
at the Philadelphia Convention and the other historical materials
bearing on the intended function of the amendment process11 leads
me to the opposite conclusion. As I understand the debates, the
Founders were concerned, first, that they not place the new government in the same straitjacket that inhibited the Confederation, unable to change fundamental law without the consent of every state.
The amendment process, rather a novelty for the time, was therefore included in the Constitution itself. Second, the final form of
article V was dictated by a major compromise between those delegates who would utilize the state legislatures as the sole means of
initiating amendments and those who would lodge that power exclusively in the national legislature. The forces at the convention
that sought to limit the power of originating amendments to the
11. E.g., LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, s. Doc. No. 39, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 135-36 (1964); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 43 & 85 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); L.
ORFIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1942); THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1937). The relevant excerpts from these and other
sources are printed as an appendix to the Hearings on the Federal Constitutional Convention Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, Oct. 30 and 31, 1967.
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states were at first dominant. The original Virginia Plan, first approved by the convention, excluded the national legislature from
participation in the amendment process. On reconsideration, the
forces that would limit the power of origination of amendments to
the national legislature became prevalent. The arguments on both
sides were persuasive: the improprieties or excesses of power in the
national government would not likely be corrected except by state
initiative, while improprieties by the state governments or deficiencies in national power would not likely be corrected except by
national initiative. In the spirit that typified the 1787 Convention,
the result was acceptance of a Madison compromise proposal which
read, as the final article was to read, in terms of alternative methods.
It is dear that neither of the two methods of amendment was
expected by the Framers to be superior to the other or easier of
accomplishment. There is certainly no indication that the national
legislature was intended to promote individual amendments while
the state legislatures were to be concerned with more extensive revisions. On the contrary, there is strong evidence that what the members of the convention were concerned with in both cases was the
power to make specific amendments. They did not appear to anticipate a need for a general revision of the Constitution. And certainly this was understandable, in light of the difficulties that they
had in finding the compromises to satisfy the divergent interests
needed for ratification of their efforts. Provision in article V for
two exceptions to the amendment power12 underlines the notion
that the convention anticipated specific amendment or amendments
rather than general revision. For it is doubtful that these exceptions
could have been expected to control a later general revision.
This construction is supported by references to the amendment
process in the Federalist Papers. In Federalist No. 43, James Madison
explained the need and function of article V as follows:
That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could
not but be foreseen. It was requisite therefore that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the
Convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It
guards equally against that extreme facility which would render the
Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty which might
perpetuate its discovered faults. It moreover equally enables the
general and the state governments to originate the amendment of
errors as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side or
on the other.
12. See the text of art. V quoted in note 1 supra.
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Hamilton, in Federalist No. 85, was even more emphatic in pointing out the possibility of specific as well as general amendment of
the Constitution on the initiative of the state legislatures:
But every amendment to the constitution, if once established,
would be a single proposition, and might be brought fonvard singly.
There would then be no necessity for management or compromise,
in relation to any other point, no giving nor taking. The will of the
requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue.
And consequently whenever nine or rather ten states, were united
in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place.

Apart from being inconsistent with the language and history of
article V, the contention that any constitutional convention must be
a wide open one is neither a practicable nor a desirable one. If the
subject matter of amendments were to be left entirely to the convention, it would be hard to expect the states to call for a convention in the absence of a general discontent with the existing
constitutional system. This construction would effectively destroy
the power of the states to originate the amendment of errors pointed
out by experience, as Madison expected them to do. Alternatively,
under that construction, applications for a limited convention deriving in some states from a dissatisfaction with the school desegregation cases, in others because of the school prayer cases, and in still
others by reason of objection to the Miranda rule, could all be combined to make up the requisite two-thirds of the states needed to
meet the requirements of article V. I find it hard to believe that
this is the type of consensus that was thought to be appropriate to
calling for a convention. For if such disparate demands were sufficient, all the applications to date-and there are a large number
of them-should be added up to see whether, in what is considered
an appropriate span of time, two-thirds of the states have made demands for a constitutional convention to propose amendments, no
matter the cause for applications or the specifications contained in
them. :Moreover, once such a convention were convened, it could
refuse to consider any of the problems or subjects specified in the
states' applications, and instead propose amendments on other subjects or rewrite the Constitution in a manner unacceptable to any
of the applicant states.
My construction of article V, with reference to the initiation of
the amendment procedure by the state legislatures, is consistent with
the literal language of the article as well as its history, and is more
desirable and practicable than the alternative construction. As I see

884

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:875

it, the intention of article V was to place the power of initiation of
amendments in the state legislatures. The function of the convention was to provide a mechanism for effectuating this initiative. The
role of the states in filing their applications would be to identify
the problem or problems that they believed to call for resolution
by way of amendment. The role of the convention that would be
called by reason of such action by the states would then be to decide
whether the problem called for correction by constitutional amendment and, if so, to frame the amendment itself and propose it for
ratification as provided in article V. The bill carries out this intention in keeping not only with the letter but also with the spirit of
article V.
The bill provides that state petitions to the Congress which request the calling of a convention under article V shall state the
nature of the amendment or amendments to be proposed by such
convention. Upon receipt of valid applications from two-thirds or
more of the states requesting a convention on the same subject or
subjects, the Congress is required to call a convention by concurrent resolution, specifying in the resolution the nature of the amendment or amendments for the consideration of which the convention
is being called. The convention may not propose amendments on
other subjects and, if it does, the Congress may refuse to submit
them to the states for ratification.
Under these provisions, the states could not require the Congress
to submit to a convention a given text of an amendment, demanding
an up or down vote on it alone. But they could require the Congress to submit a single subject or problem, demanding action on
it alone. They could not, however, define the subject so narrowly
as to deprive the convention of all deliberative freedom. To use
the reapportionment issue as an example, the states could not require the Congress to call a convention to accept or reject the exact
text of the reapportionment amendment recommended by the Council of State Governments, for then the convention would be merely
a ratifying body. But they could properly petition for a convention
to consider the propriety of proposing a constitutional amendment
to deal with the reapportionment problems raised by the Supreme
Court decisions, defining those problems in specific terms. The convention would then be confined to that subject, but it would be free
to consider the propriety of proposing any amendment and the form
the amendment should take-that of the Dirksen proposal, the Tuck
proposal, or some other form. To take another example, those states
which might desire a convention to deal with the Escobedo-Miranda
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issue could phrase their petitions generally in terms of the problem
of federal control over the criminal processes of the states. The convention would then be confined to that subject, but would nevertheless have great deliberative freedom to canvass all possible solutions and propose whatever amendment or amendments it deemed
appropriate to respond to the problems identified by the states.
I am convinced that these provisions of the bill fully accord with
the mandate of article V, its history, and intended function.

B. May Congress Refuse To Call a Convention?
Perhaps the next most important question raised by the bill is
whether the Congress has any discretion to refuse to call a convention in the face of appropriate applications from a sufficient number of states.
Article V states that Congress "shall" call a convention upon the
applications of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. I have
absolutely no doubt that the article is peremptory and that the
duty is mandatory, leaving no discretion to the Congress to review
the wisdom of the state applications. Certainly this is the more desirable construction, consonant with the intended arrangement of
article V as described in the preceding section of this article. The
founders included the convention alternative in the amending article to enable the states to initiate constitutional reform in the event
the national legislature refused to do so. To concede to the Congress any discretion to consider the wisdom and necessity of a particular convention call would in effect destroy the role of the states.
The comments of both Madison and Hamilton, subsequent to
the 1787 Convention, sustain this construction. In a letter on the
subject, Madison observed that the question concerning the calling
of a convention "will not belong to the Federal Legislature. If twothirds of the states apply £or one, Congress cannot refuse to call it:
if not, the other mode of amendments must be pursued." 18 Hamilton, in the Federalist No. 85, stated:
By the fifth article of the plan the congress will be obliged, "on
the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, (which
at present amounts to nine) to call a convention for proposing
amendments, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as
part of the constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of threefourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof."
Ill. U.S. BUREAU OF Rou.s AND LIBRARY, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V, 141, 143, quoting Madison's letter to Mr. Eve,
dated Jan. 2, 1789.
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The words of this article are peremptory. The congress "shall call a
convention." Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion.

It has been argued forcefully_ that, notwithstanding the language
of article V, the Congress need not call a convention if it does not
wish to do so, and that, in any event no legislation such as this can
commit a future Congress to call a convention against its judgment.
This argument is based on the premise that although article V provides that Congress "shall" call a convention if enough states apply,
this word may be interpreted to mean "may" for all practical purposes, since the courts are not apt to try to enforce the obligation
if Congress wishes to evade it. I cannot accept such a flagrant disregard of clear language and purpose.
Although it may be true that no legislation by one Congress can
bind a subsequent Congress to vote for a convention, and that the
courts will not intervene, it is my strong feeling that the bill should
recognize the fact that the Congress has a strict constitutional duty
to call a convention if a sufficient number of proper applications
are received. The bill does this by providing that it shall be the duty
of both houses to agree to a concurrent resolution calling a convention whenever it shall be determined that two-thirds of the state
legislatures have properly petitioned for a convention to propose
an amendment or amendments on the same subject. Concededly,
the Congress cannot be forced by the courts or by the provisions of
this bill to vote for a particular convention. However, every member has taken an oath to support the Constitution, and I cannot believe a majority of the Congress will choose to ignore its clear obligation. I would hope, moreover, that this bill will facilitate the path
to congressional action by underlining the obligation of the Congress to act.
C. Sufficiency of State Applications
Assuming the Congress may not weigh the wisdom and necessity
of state applications requesting the calling of a constitutional convention, does it have the power to judge the validity of state applications and state legislative procedures adopting such applications?
Clearly the Congress has some such power. The fact alone that Congress is made the agency for convening the convention upon the
receipt of the requisite number of state applications suggests that
it must exercise some power to judge the validity of those applications. The impotence or withdrawal of the courts underlines the
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necessity for lodging some such power in the Congress. The relevant
question, then, concerns the extent of that power.
It has been contended that Congress must have broad powers to
judge the validity of state applications and that such power must
include the authority to look beyond the content of an application,
and its formal compliance with article V, to the legislative procedures followed in adopting the application. The counterargument
is that to grant Congress the power to reject applications, particularly if that power is not carefully circumscribed, would be to supply it with a means of avoiding altogether the obligation to call a
convention. The result would be that the Congress could arbitrarily
reject all applications on subjects it did not considerate appropriate
for amendment, leaving us in effect with only one amendment process.
In drafting the bill I was mainly concerned with limiting the
power of the Congress to frustrate the initiative of the states, particularly since the debate on the Senate floor at that time indicated
that some Senators were inclined to seize on any slight irregularity
in a petition as a basis for not counting it. My bill, as introduced,
therefore set forth only requirements as to the content of state applications, leaving questions of legislative procedure for determination solely by the individual states, with their decisions made binding
on the Congress and the courts. However, I think the hearings amply
demonstrated the danger of disabling the Congress from reviewing
the procedural validity of state petitions. In general, state legislatures
ought to be masters of their own procedures. But this is a federal
function that they would be performing, and the Congress should
retain some power uniformly to settle the questions of irregularity
that might arise. The bill has therefore been amended to remove
the disability of the Congress to review legislative procedures. Under
the amended bill, Congress would retain broad powers in this respect, indeterminate and unforeseeable in nature, but to be exercised, I would hope, rarely and with restraint.
It might be well to say something at this point on a question
that is much debated: whether a legislature that has been held to
be malapportioned, or that is under a decree requiring it to reapportion and perhaps qualifying its powers in some measure before
reapportionment, can validly pass a resolution for a constitutional
convention. I should think in general that it could, unless an outstanding decree forbids it to do so, either specifically or by mention

888

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:875

of some analogous forbidden function. To open to congressional review the question of the propriety of state legislative composition
would be to open a Pandora's box of constitutional doubts about
the validity even of the fourteenth amendment.
However, the bill does not expressly answer this question. This
is one of the many questions of irregularity on which the Congress
will have to work its will should the question be squarely presented
in the form of thirty-four state applications including some passed
by malapportioned legislatures.
One further important point should be mentioned. Most of the
states obviously do not now understand their role in designating
subjects or problems for resolution by amendment, and many of
them do not even know where to send their applications. By setting
forth the formal.requirements with respect to content of state applications and designating the congressional officers to whom they
must be transmitted, the bill furnishes guidance to the states on
these questions and promises to avert in the future some of the problems that have arisen in the current effort to convene a convention.
The bill also requires that all applications received by the Congress
be printed in the Congressional Record and that copies be sent to
all members of Congress and to the legislature of each of the other
states. In this way, the element of congressional surprise can be eliminated, and each state can be given prompt and full opportunity to
join in any call for a convention in which it concurs.
D. The Role of State Governors
The argument has been made that a state application for a constitutional convention must be approved by both the legislature and
the governor of the state to be effective. This argument rests on the
claim that article V intended state participation in the process to
involve the whole legislative process of the state as defined in the
state constitution. I do not agree with that argument. We do not
have here any question about the exercise of the lawmaking process
by a state legislature in combination with whatever executive participation might be called for by state law. We have rather a question of heeding the voice of the people of a state in expressing the
possible need for a change in the fundamental document. It seems
clear to me that the Founders properly viewed the state legislatures
as the sole representative of the people on such a matter, since the
executive veto, a carryover from the requirement of royal assent,
was not regarded as the expression of popular opinion at the time
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of the 1787 Convention. And, to resort to the kind of literalism invoked by others as appropriate for construction of other provisions
of article V, the language of the article definitely asserts that the
appropriate applications are to come from "the Legislatures."
Closely analogous court decisions support this interpretation.
The Supreme Court in Hawke v. Smith, No. 1 14 interpreted the term
"legislatures" in the ratification clause of article V to mean the
representative lawmaking bodies of the states, since ratification of
a constitutional amendment "is not an act of legislation within the
proper sense of the word." 15 Certainly the term "legislature" should
have the same meaning in both the application clause and the ratification clause of article V. Further support is found in the decision
in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 16 in which the Court held that a constitutional amendment approved for proposal to the states by a twothirds vote of Congress need not be submitted to the President for
his signature or veto.
The bill therefore provides specifically that a state application
need not be approved by the state's governor in order to be effective.

E. May a State Rescind Its Application?
The question of whether a state should be allowed to rescind an
application previously forwarded to the Congress is another of the
political questions to which the courts have not supplied answers
and presumably cannot. The Supreme Court has held that questions
concerning the rescission of prior ratifications or rejections of amendments proposed by the Congress are determinable solely by Congress.17 Presumably, then, the question of rescission of an application for a convention is also political and nonjusticiable. Although
the Congress has previously taken the position that a state may not
rescind its prior ratification of an amendment, it has taken no position concerning rescission of applications. My strong conviction is
that rescission should be permitted. Since a two-thirds consensus
among the states at some point in time is necessary in order for the
Congress to call a convention, the Congress should consider whether
there has been a change of mind among some states that have earlier
applied. Moreover, an application is not a final action, since it serves
merely to initiate a convention, and does not commit even the ap14. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
15. Id. at 229.
16. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
17. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 448-49 (1939).

890

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:875

plicant state to any substantive amendment that might eventually
be proposed.
The bill therefore provides that a state may rescind at any time
before its application is included among an accumulation of applications from two-thirds of the states, at which time the obligation of
the Congress to call a convention becomes fixed. Incidentally, the
bill also provides that a state may rescind its prior ratification of an
amendment proposed by the convention up until the time there are
existing valid ratifications by three-fourths of the states, and that a
state may change its mind and ratify a proposed amendment that it
previously has rejected.
F. How Long Does an Application Remain Valid?
Another much debated point concerning state applications for
a constitutional convention is timing. In order to be effective to
mandate the Congress to act, within how long a period must applications be received from two-thirds of the state legislatures? Article V is silent on this question, and neither the Congress nor the
courts has supplied an answer.
The Congress and the courts have agreed that constitutional
amendments proposed by the Congress and submitted to the states
for ratification can properly remain valid for ratification for a period
of seven years. It has been felt that there should be a "reasonably
contemporaneous" expression by three-fourths of the states that an
amendment is acceptable in order for the Congress to conclude that
a consensus in favor of the amendment exists among the people, and
that ratification within a seven-year period satisfies this requirement.18 Presumably, the same principle should govern the application stage of the constitutional amendment process. If so, the Congress would not be required, nor empowered, to call a convention
unless it received "relatively contemporaneous" valid applications
from the necessary number of states. This rule seems sensible. The
Constitution contemplates a concurrent desire for a convention on
the part of the legislatures of a sufficient number of states, and such
a concurrent desire can scarcely be said to exist, or to reflect in each
state the will of the people, if too long a period of time has passed
from the date of enactment of the first application to the date of
enactment of the last. It is true that legislatures are free under the
bill to change their minds and rescind their applications; but the
passage of a repealer is a different and more difficult political act
18. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).

March 1968]

Proposed Legislation

891

than the defeat, starting fresh, of an application calling for a constitutional convention. The fact, therefore, that a legislature has not
rescinded an application calling for a convention is an insufficient
indication that the state in question, after the passage of a long period
of time, still favors the calling of a convention.
What, then, is a proper period during which tendered applications are sufficiently contemporaneous to be counted together? Some
Senators and scholars have suggested that two years, the lifetime of
a Congress, would be a reasonable period. Others have suggested
that petitions should remain valid for a generation. My feeling when
I drafted the bill was that six years would be a reasonable compromise. However, the hearings revealed a general disposition among
the witnesses to agree on a four-year period. Since this would be
long enough to afford ample opportunity to all the state legislatures
to join in the call for a convention-particularly in view of the requirement in the bill that all other states be given immediate notice
of any application received by the Congress-I have concluded that
a four-year period is preferable.
The bill has therefore been amended to provide that an application shall remain valid for four years after receipt by the Congress
unless sooner rescinded. The bill also provides that rescission must
be accomplished by means of the same legislative procedures followed in adopting the application in question, and that the Congress
retains power to judge the validity of those proceedings.

G. Calling the Convention
The bill provides that the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk
of the House of Representatives shall keep a record of the number
of state applications received, according to subject matter. Whenever
two-thirds of the states have submitted applications on the same subject or subjects, the presiding officer of each house shall be notified
and shall announce the same on the floor. Each house is left free to
adopt its own rules for determining the validity of the applications,
presumably by reference to a committee followed by floor action.
Once a determination has been made that there are valid applications from two-thirds or more of the state legislatures on the same
subject or subjects, each house must agree to a concurrent resolution
providing for the convening of a constitutional convention on such
subject or subjects. The concurrent resolution would designate the
place and time of meeting of the convention, set forth the nature
of the amendment or amendments the convention is empowered to
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consider and propose, and provide for such other things as the provision of funds to pay the expenses of the convention and to compensate the delegates. The convention would be required to be convened not later than one year after adoption of the resolution.
As introduced, the bill required the Congress to designate in the
concurrent resolution convening a convention the manner in which
any amendments proposed by the convention must be ratified by
the states and the period within which they must be ratified or
deemed inoperative. Testimony at the hearings suggested that these
determinations might properly be influenced by the nature of the
amendments proposed and that they should therefore not be required to be made at the time the convention is called. For example,
certain proposed amendments might call for ratification by state
conventions rather than state legislatures, and certain circumstances
might indicate a shorter or longer period than usual during which
ratification should take place. The Congress should be able to make
those decisions after it has the convention's proposals. The bill therefore has been amended to so provide.
H. Selection and Apportionment of Delegates

The bill as introduced provided that each state should have as
many delegates as it is entitled to representatives in Congress, to
be elected or appointed as provided by state law. However, the hearings revealed a general feeling that the national interest is too closely
affected to permit each state to decide how its delegates to a national
constitutional convention shall be elected, or, indeed, appointed. For
this reason, the bill has been amended to require that delegates be
elected-not appointed-and that they be elected by the same constituency that elects the states' representatives in Congress. Under
the amended bill, each state will be entitled to as many delegates as
it is entitled to Senators and Representatives in Congress. Two delegates in each state will be elected at large and one delegate will be
elected from each congressional district in the manner provided by
state law. Vacancies in a state's delegation will be filled by appoint•
ment of the governor.

I. Convention Procedure and Voting
The bill provides that the Vice President of the United States
shall convene the constitutional convention, administer the oath of
office of the delegates and preside until a presiding officer is elected.
The presiding officer will then preside over the election of other
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officers and thereafter. Further proceedings of the convention will
be in accordance with rules adopted by the convention. A daily
record of all convention proceedings, including the votes of delegates, shall be kept, and shall be transmitted to the Archivist of the
United States within thirty days after the convention terminates.
The convention must terminate its proceedings within one year of
its opening unless the period is extended by the Congress by concurrent resolution.
As introduced, the bill provided that each state should have one
vote on all matters before the convention, including the proposal of
amendments. This was decided upon in deference to the method
followed in the 1787 Convention rather than from a conviction that
this would be the necessarily proper procedure in conventions called
under article V. On the basis of the testimony presented at the hearings, I have decided that unit voting would not be appropriate for
such conventions. The reasons for unit voting in the 1787 Convention were peculiar to the background against which that convention
worked and are not valid today. Moreover, the states, as units, will
have equal say in the ratification process. It seems appropriate, therefore, to recognize the interests of majority rule in the method of proposing amendments. Hence, the bill has been amended to provide
that each state delegate shall have one vote so that the voting strength
of each state will be in proportion to its population.
Finally, the bill provides that amendments may be proposed by
the convention by a vote of a majority of the total number of delegates to the convention. The alternative would be to impose a twothirds voting requirement analogous to the requirement for congressional proposal of amendments. However, article V does not call for
this, and I think that such a requirement would place an undue and
unnecessary obstacle in the way of effective utilization of the convention amendment process.

J.

Ratification of Proposed Amendments

The bill provides that any amendment proposed by the convention must be transmitted to the Congress within the thirty days after
the convention terminates its proceedings. The Congress must then
transmit the proposed amendment to the Administrator of General
Services for submission to the states. However, the Congress may, by
concurrent resolution, refuse to approve an amendment for submission to the states for ratification, on the grounds of procedural irregularities in the convention or failure of the amendment to con-
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form to the limitations on subject matter imposed by the Congress
in the concurrent resolution calling the convention. The intent is
to provide a means of remedying a refusal by the convention to abide
by the limitations on its authority to amend the Constitution. Of
course, unlimited power in the Congress to refuse to submit proposed amendments for ratification would destroy the independence
of the second alternative amending process. Therefore, the Congress
is explicitly forbidden to refuse to submit a proposed amendment
for ratification because of doubts about the merits of its substantive
provisions. The power is reserved for use only with respect to amendments outside the scope of the convention's authority or in the case
of serious procedural irregularities.
Ratification by the states must be by state legislative action or
convention, as the Congress may direct, and within the time period
specified by the Congress. The Congress retains the power to review
the validity of ratification procedures. As noted earlier, any state
may rescind its prior ratification of an amendment by the same processes by which it ratified it, except that no state may rescind after
that amendment has been validly ratified by three-fourths of the
states. When three-fourths of the states have ratified a proposed
amendment, the Administrator of General Services shall issue a proclamation that the amendment is a part of the Constitution, effective
from the date of the last necessary ratification.

IV.

CONCLUSION

There is some evidence that the current effort to require the
Congress to call a convention to propose a reapportionment amendment has failed and that the danger of a constitutional crisis has
passed. The two additional applications needed to bring the total
to thirty-four have not been received and there is a strong likelihood
that some applicant states will rescind their applications. Even if
this is the case, however, the need for legislation to implement article V remains. There may well be other attempts to utilize the convention amendment process and, in the absence of legislation, the
same unanswered questions will return to plague us. The legislation
therefore is still timely, and the Congress may now have the opportunity to deal with the sensitive constitutional issues objectively,
uninfluenced by competing views on state apportionment or any
other substantive issue.
Some have argued that the convention method of amendment is
an anomaly in the law, out of step with modern notions of majority
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rule and the relationship between the states and the federal government. If so, that part of article V should be stricken from the Constitution by the appropriate amendment process. It should not, however, be undermined by erecting every possible barrier in the way
of its effective use. Such a course would be a disavowal of the clear
language and history of article V. The Constitution made the amendment process difficult, and properly so. It certainly was not the intention of the original Convention to make it impossible. Nor is it
possible to conclude that the Founders intended that amendments
originating in the states should have so much harder a time of it
than those proposed by Congress. As I have pointed out, that issue
was fought out in 1787 Convention and resolved in favor of two
originating sources, both difficult of achievement, but neither impossible and neither more difficult than the other. My bill seeks to
preserve the symmetry of article V by implementing the convention
alternative so as to make it a practicable but not easy method of
constitutional amendment.
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APPENDIX

s. 2307
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

A

BILL

To provide procedures for calling constitutional conventions
for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, on application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the
States, pursuant to article V of the Constitution.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
That this Act may be cited as the "Federal Constitution Convention Amendment Act."
APPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

SEC. 2. The legislature of a State, in making application to the
Congress for a constitutional convention under article V of the Constitution of the United States, shall adopt a resolution pursuant to
this Act stating, in substance, that the legislature requests the calling
of a convention for the purpose of proposing one or more amendments to the Constitution of the United States and stating the nature
of the amendment or amendments to be proposed.
APPLICATION PROCEDURE

SEC. 3(a) For the purpose of adopting or rescinding a resolution pursuant to section 2, the State legislature shall follow the rules
of procedure that govern the enactment of a statute by that legislature, but without the need for approval of the legislature's action
by the governor of the State.
(b) Questions concerning the State legislative procedure
and the validity of the adoption of a State resolution cognizable
under this Act shall be determinable by the Congress of the United
States and its decisions thereon shall be binding on all others, including State and Federal courts.
TRANSMITTAL OF APPLICATIONS

SEC. 4(a) Within thirty days after the adoption by the legislature of a State of a resolution to apply for the calling of a constitutional convention, the secretary of state of the State, or if there be
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no such officer, the person who is charged by the State law with such
function, shall transmit to the Congress of the United States two
copies of the application, one addressed to the President of the Senate, and one to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(b) Each copy of the application so made by any State
shall contain(!) the title of the resolution,
(2) the exact text of the resolution, signed by the
presiding officer of each house of the State legislature, and
(3) the date on which the legislature adopted the
resolution; and shall be accompanied by a certificate of the secretary
of state of the State, or such other person as is charged by the State
law with such function, certifying that the application accurately
sets forth the text of the resolution.
(c) Within ten days after receipt of a copy of any such
application, the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall report to the House of which he is presiding
officer, identifying the State making application, the subject of the
application, and the number of States then having made application
on such subject. The President of the Senate and Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall cause copies of such application to
be sent to the presiding officer of each House of the legislature of
every other State and to each member of the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Congress of the United States.
EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF APPLICATIONS

SEC. 5(a) An application submitted to the Congress by a State
pursuant to this Act, unless sooner rescinded by the State legislature,
shall remain effective for four calendar years after the date it is received by the Congress, except that whenever the Congress determines that within a period of four calendar years two-thirds or more
of the several States have each submitted a valid application calling
for a constitutional convention on the same subject all such applications shall remain in effect until the Congress has taken action on a
concurrent resolution, pursuant to section 8, calling for a constitutional convention.
(b) A State may rescind its application calling for a constitutional convention by adopting and transmitting to the Congress
a resolution of rescission in conformity with the procedure specified
in sections 3 and 4, except that no such rescission shall be effective as
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to any valid application made for a constitutional convention upon
any subject after the date on which two-thirds or more of the State
legislatures have valid applications pending before the Congress
seeking amendments on the same subject.
(c) Questions concerning the rescission of a State's application shall be determined solely by the Congress of the United
States and its decisions shall be binding on all others, including
State and Federal courts.
CALLING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

SEC. 6(a) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Senate and
the Clerk of the House of Representatives to maintain a record of
all applications received by the President of the Senate and Speaker
of the House of Representatives from States for the calling of a constitutional convention upon each subject. Whenever the Secretary
or the Clerk has reason to believe that valid applications made by
two-thirds or more of the States with respect to the same subject are
in effect, he shall so report in writing to the officer to whom those
applications were transmitted, and such officer thereupon shall announce upon the floor of the House of which he is an officer the
substance of such report. Pursuant to such rules as such House may
adopt, it shall be the duty of such House to determine whether the
recitation contained in any such report is correct. If either House of
the Congress determines, upon a consideration of any such report or
of a concurrent resolution agreed to by the other House of the Congress, that there are in effect valid applications made by two-thirds
or more of the States for the calling of a constitutional convention
upon the same subject, it shall be the duty of that House to agree to
a concurrent resolution calling for the convening of a Federal constitutional convention upon that subject. Each such concurrent
resolution shall (1) designate the place and time of meeting of the
convention; (2) set forth the nature of the amendment or amendments for the consideration of which the convention is called; and
(3) authorize the appropriation of moneys for the payment of all expenses of the convention, including the compensation of delegates
and employees. A copy of each such concurrent resolution agreed to
by both Houses of the Congress shall be transmitted forthwith to the
presiding officer of each House of the Legislature of each State.
(b) The convention shall be convened not later than one
year after the adoption of the resolution.
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DELEGATES

SEC. 7(a) A convention called under this Act shall be composed
of as many delegates from each State as it is entitled to Senators and
Representatives in Congress. In each State two delegates shall be
elected at large and one delegate shall be elected from each Congressional district in the manner provided by State law. Any vacancy
occurring in a State delegation shall be filled by appointment of the
Governor of that State.
(b) The secretary of state of each State, or, if there be no
such officer, the person charged by State law to perform such function shall certify to the Vice President of the United States the name
of each delegate elected or appointed by the Governor pursuant to
this section.
(c) Delegates shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at a session of the convention, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any speech or debate in the convention they
shall not be questioned in any other place.
(d) Each delegate shall receive compensation for each
day of service and shall be compensated for traveling and related
expenses. Provision shall be made therefore in the concurrent resolution calling the convention. The convention shall fix the compensation of employees of the convention.
CONVENING THE CONVENTION

SEC. 8(a) The Vice President of the United States shall convene
the constitutional convention. He shall administer the oath of office
of the delegates to the convention and shall preside until the delegates elect a presiding officer who shall preside thereafter. Before
taking his seat each delegate shall subscribe an oath not to attempt
to change or alter any section, clause or article of the Constitution
or propose additions thereto except in conformity with the concurrent resolution calling the convention. Upon the election of permanent officers of the convention, the names of such officers shall be
transmitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives by the elected presiding officer of the
convention. Further proceedings of the convention shall be conducted in accordance with such rules, not inconsistent with this Act,
as the convention may adopt.
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(b) The Congress shall appropriate moneys for the payment of all expenses of the convention.
(c) Under such regulations as the President shall prescribe, the Administrator of General Services shall provide such
facilities, and each executive department and agency shall provide
such information, as the convention may require, upon written request made by the elected presiding officer of the convention.
PROCEDURES OF THE CONVENTION

SEC. 9(a) In voting on any question before the convention,
including the proposal of amendments, each delegate shall have one
vote.
(b) The convention shall keep a daily verbatim record of
its proceedings and publish the same. The votes of the delegates on
any question shall be entered on the record.
(c) The convention shall terminate its proceedings within
one year after the date of its first meeting unless the period is extended by the Congress by concurrent resolution.
(d) Within thirty days after the termination of the proceedings of the convention, the presiding officer shall transmit to the
Archivist of the United States all records of official proceedings of
the convention.
PROPOSAL OF AMENDMENTS

SEC. IO(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
a convention called under this Act may propose amendments to the
Constitution by a vote of a majority of the total number of delegates
to the convention.
(b) No convention called under this Act may propose any
amendment or amendments of a general nature different from that
stated in the concurrent resolution calling the convention. Questions
arising under this subsection shall be determined solely by the Congress of the United States and its decisions shall be binding on all
others, including state and Federal courts.
APPROVAL BY THE CONGRESS AND TRANSMITTAL
TO THE STATES FOR RATIFICATION

SEC. ll(a) The presiding officer of the convention shall, within
thirty days after the termination of its proceedings, submit the exact
text of any amendment or amendments agreed upon by the con-
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vention to the Congress for approval and transmittal to the several
States for their ratification.
(b) The Congress, before the expiration of the first period
of three months of continuous session following receipt of any proposed amendment, shall, by concurrent resolution, transmit such
proposed amendment to the States for ratification, prescribing the
time within which such amendment shall be ratified or deemed inoperative and the manner in which such amendment shall be ratified
in accordance with Article V of the Constitution: Provided, That,
within such period, the Congress may, by concurrent resolution, disapprove the submission of the proposed amendment to the States for
ratification on the ground that its general nature is different from
that stated in the concurrent resolution calling the convention or
that the proposal of the amendment by the convention was not in
conformity with the provisions of this Act: Provided further, that the
Congress shall not disapprove the submission of a proposed amendment for ratification by the States because of its substantive provisions.
(c) If, upon the expiration of the period prescribed in the
preceding subsection, the Congress has not adopted a concurrent
resolution transmitting or disapproving the transmittal of a proposed
amendment to the States for ratification, the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, acting jointly, shall
transmit such proposed amendment to the Administrator of General
Services for submission to the States. The Administrator of General
Services shall transmit exact copies of the same, together with his
certification thereof, to the legislatures of the several States.
RATIFICATION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

SEC. 12(a) Any amendment proposed by the convention and
submitted to the States in accordance with the provisions of this Act
shall be valid for all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution
of the United States when duly ratified by three-fourths of the States
in the manner and within the time specified.
(b) Acts of ratification shall be by convention or by State
legislative action as the Congress may direct or as specified in subsection (c) of this section. For the purpose of ratifying proposed
amendments transmitted to the States pursuant to this Act the State
legislaures shall adopt their own rules of procedure. Any State action
ratifying a proposed amendment to the Constitution shall be valid
without the assent of the Governor of the State.
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(c) Any proposed amendment transmitted to the States
pursuant to the provisions of section ll(c) of this Act shall be ratified
by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven
years of the date of transmittal or be deemed inoperative.
(d) The secretary of state of the State, or if there be no
such officer, the person who is charged by State law with such function, shall transmit a certified copy of the State action ratifying any
proposed amendment to the Administrator of General Services.
REsCISSION OF RATIFICATIONS

SEC. 13(a) Any State may rescind its ratification of a proposed
amendment by the same processes by which it ratified the proposed
amendment, except that no State may rescind when there are existing valid ratifications of such amendment by three-fourths of the
States.
. (b) Any State may ratify a proposed amendment even
though it previously may have rejected the same proposal.
(c) Questions concerning State ratification or rejection
of amendments proposed to the Constitution of the United States
shall be determined solely by the Congress of the United States, and
its decisions shall be binding on all others, including State and
Federal courts.
PROCLAMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

SEC. 14. The Administrator of General Services, when threefourths of the several States have ratified a proposed amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, shall issue a proclamation that
the amendment is a part of the Constitution of the United States.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENTS

SEC. 15. An amendment proposed to the Constitution of the
United States shall be effective from the date specified therein or, if
no date is specified, then on the date on which the last State necessary
to constitute three-fourths of the States of the United States, as provided for in article V, has ratified the same.

